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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ketchum concurs with KGF's statements regarding the nature of the case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Ketchum concurs with KGF's statements regarding the course of proceedings below. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 2005, the City of Ketchum determined that potential retail and hotel space in 
the Community Core District was being permanently lost to single family homes and purely 
residential projects. As proof of this, established businesses were closing on a regular basis, the 
local economy was flat, tourism and skier days had plateaued, historic landmarks were being 
demolished and most of Ketchum's workforce commuted to the city from far away. City leaders 
believed that Ketchum was losing its identity as a community. (R. p. 21 1, Afidavit of Elizabeth 
Robuahn, Exhibit D to Exhibit 3 of Exhibit 3, "Ketchurn Downtown Master Plan") 
2. Due to a rapidly deteriorating Community Core District and the need for 
economic revitalization, Ketchum passed an emergency moratorium in its Community Core 
District. The City started a community-based effort to restructure that district to revitalize the 
city. (R. p. 69, LL. 1-2) 
3. Ketchum's first step after imposing the moratorium was to hire a master planner 
to engage the community to develop a master plan. (R. p. 69, LL. 7-10) In the course of over 
three dozen public meetings, public hearings, design charettes, massing studies', economic 
analyses and discussion sessions, the community and the master planner developed the Ketchum 
Downtown Master Plan Framework in January 2006 (the "Framework"), followed by the 
ICetchum Downtown Master Plan in July, 2006 (the "Master Plan"). (R. p. 69, LL. 13-21; p. 70, 
LL. 1-3). 
4. The Framework and Master Plan recommended sweeping changes. It 
recommended that Ketchum (1) replace its entire Community Core Zoning regulations with a 
form-based zoning code, (2) form a community development corporation, (3) create an urban 
renewal agency, (4) purchase land for affordable workforce housing projects and parking lots, 
(5) design the Fourth Street Heritage Corridor, (6) build the first two blocks of this substantial 
streetscape improvement and (7) adopt ordinances encouraging the development of new hotels. 
More importantly, both the Framework and the Master Plan call for the creation of an ordinance 
allowing for the Transfer of Development Rights ("TDRs") as a critical component in the 
protection and revitalization of Ketchum. (R. p. 21 1, Afidavit of Elizabeth Robrahn, Exhibit D 
to Exhibit 3 of Exhibit 3, "Ketchum Downtown Master Plan"; R. p. 70, LL. 4-5). 
5. In August 2005, Claudia Walsworth, a cultural resource consultant, prepared an 
"Archeological and Historic Survey Report" surveying all structures with historic, architectural, 
archeological or cultural significance located in the City of Ketchum (the "Historic Survey"). 
(R. p. 70, LL. 6-9) 
6. In preparing the first draft of a TDR Ordinance, Ketchum Senior Planner 
' A massing study is a review of the height and scale of existing buildings, with recommendations regarding 
suggested heights and scales for future buildings. 
Elizabeth Robrahn reviewed the Historic Survey with the Ketchuin Historic Preservation 
Commission. On the basis of that review, the I-Iistoric Preservation Commission recommended 
criteria for TDR sending sites and identified the properties that it wanted to preserve by 
designating such properties as TDR sending sites.' In evaluating sites, the Commission and the 
City reviewed factors including the historical, architectural, educational, and cultural 
significance of the sites. (R. p. 70, LL. 11-16). 
7. Followiilg the course set by the community in the Framework, the Master Plan, 
and the Historic Survey, in the summer of 2006, Ketchum's Planning and Zoning Department 
began the long process of creating an ordinance that would employ TDRs for historic 
preservation and economic revitalization. (R. p. 71, LL. 1-5) 
8. The goal of the ordinance was to give developers and property owners a voluntary 
incentive to preserve Ketchum's historic properties and1 or heritage sites by accon~modating the 
financial and market realities of such preservation. This in turn would mitigate and eventually 
eliminate the declining sense of community and place, maintain a sense of human scale and 
proportion, encourage new development of cominercial space on the ground floor and encourage 
the development of affordable housing on middle floors. The program only works if developers 
participate and developers will participate only if they can make a profit. That profit comes from 
one additional floor of building height. (R. p. 21 1, @davit of Elizabeth Robrahn, Exhibit F to 
Exhibit 3 of Exhibit 3, "Staff Report, Ketchum Planning and Zoning Commission"). 
The transfer of development rights involves both receiving and sending sites. A sending site is the parcel of land 
from which the development rights will be transfe~~ed. A receiving site is the parcel of land to which development 
rights are transferred. 
9. The procedures used in the adoption of Ketchum's current TDR Ordinance are set 
forth accurately in KGF's Statement of Facts, Paragraphs 15 through 20. 
111. Additional Issues Presented On Appeal 
A. WHETHER KETCHUM IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S COSTS AND E%ES 
IV. Argument 
A. KETCHUM HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE TDR 
ORDINANCE 
KGF argues that Ketchum's use of TDRs to implement planning goals, preserve historic 
buildings, and regulate building height exceeds the City's authority. Although the details of a 
given system may differ as to the particulars, a system of transferable development rights 
generally restricts development on one parcel of land, in order to transfer the unused potential 
development capacity to another parcel of land for more intense development than would have 
been possible without such a transfer. Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4" ed.), 5 34:13. 
There is nothing unique or special about the transfer of development rights, it is only a 
tool to allow more intense development in one area in exchange for less development in another 
area. The authority to allow the transfer of development rights is directly derived from the local 
government's constitutional police power to regulate land use. A limitation of such power must 
be clearly expressed by the Legislature, or be limited by express or implied preemption. The 
authority to regulate land use, a constitutional power, can only be limited through a clearly 
expressed intent by the Legislature to limit or regulate the power, or by express or implied 
preemption. 
Ketchurn, like all cities and counties in Idaho, has two sources of authority empowering it 
to enact land use laws. The first source is the Idaho Constitution, Article XIS, Section 2: 
LOCAL POLICE REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED, Any county or incorporated 
city or tow1 may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, 
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this Constitutional provision as a source of authority 
empowering cities to enact zoning regulations. Gumprecht v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 
I04 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983); citing Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 
Idaho 506, 511, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (1977); Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of 
Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 562, 468 P.2d 290, 294 (1970). The police power includes the power to 
zone. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,49 S.Ct. 50 (1928). 
Thus, the Idaho Constitution grants plenary police power to counties and cities so long as 
their enactments "are not in conflict with [the city's] charter or the general laws. City ofIdaho 
Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90,93, 117 P.2d 461,464 (1941) ("it should be remembered that the 
adoption of zoning ordinances, and the regulation of construction of building in various zones or 
districts, is the exercise of the police power of the municipality and is purely 
governmentaP')(emphasis in original). 
The second source of authority to enact zoning regulations is the Local Land Use 
Planning Act ("LLUPA"), which actually requires Idaho's cities and counties to zone. S.C. 5 67- 
6503. Within its zoning districts, Idaho's cities and counties "shall where appropriate, establish 
standards to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories . . ." I.C. 3 67-651 1. 
KGF asserts that LLUPA has preempted the City's police powers as to zoning. Such an 
assertion is wrong. LLUPA does not limit a city's police powers, but rather, provides 
comprehensive statutory procedures for the use of such police powers in the coiltext of planning 
and zoning. KGF cites Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 
(1983), overruled on other grounds, Boise City v. Keep the Commandments Coalition, 143 Idaho 
254, 141 P.3d 1123 (2006) as authority for the proposition that LLUPA has preempted a city's 
police powers as to zoning. On the contrary, Gumprecht actually states that "the power of 
counties and municipalities to zone is a police power authorized by Art. XII, Section 2, of the 
Idaho Constitution," Id. at 1216, 617. The Gumprecht Court goes on to recognize that LLUPA 
actually directs cities to use this police power to plan and zone, and LLUPA "establishes explicit 
and express procedures to be followed" when using that power. Id. Thus, there is absolutely no 
legal foundation for an argument tliat the mere provision of procedures in LLUPA preempts a 
city's most basic constitutional authority. 
The Supreme Court in City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 685 P.2d 821 (1984) 
reiterated this basic tenet of zoning law; that zoning is an exercise of a city's constitutional police 
power. In that case, the City of Lewiston banned mobile homes in R-1 and R-2 zones. Although 
LLUPA had been in effect for eight years at the time the case was decided, the Court held that 
the City had the authority to prohibit mobile homes in R-1 and R-2 Zones under its police power, 
even in light of LLUPA: 
Local legislative bodies are authorized to enact zoning ordinances restricting use 
of property within the corporate limits. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine 
County, 98 Ildaho 506, 511, 567 P.2d 1257, I262 (1977); White v. City of Twin 
Falls, 81 Idaho 176, 183, 338 P.2d 778, 782 (1959). The zoning power is not 
unlimited; the power to zone derives from the police power of the state, and 
zoning ordinances must therefore bear a reasonable relation to goals properly 
pursued by the state through its police power. Idaho Const. Art. 12, § 2; Dawson 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra: see Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. 
v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 562, 468 P.2d 290, 294 (1970). A strong 
presumption exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances. Dawson 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra, 98 Idaho at 51 1, 567 P.2d at 1262. The 
burden of proving that the ordinance is invalid rests upon the party challenging its 
validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome only by a clear 
showing that the ordinance as applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and 
capricious. Wyckoffv. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 12, 14, 607 P.2d 
1066, 1068 (1980). Where there is a basis for a reasonable difference of opinion, 
or if the validity of legislative classification for zoning purposes is debatable, a 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local zoning authority. 
Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra, 98 Idaho at 512, 567 P.2d at 
1263. 
Id. at 83, 824. Had LLUPA preempted Lewiston's police powers as to zoning, the Court would 
have analyzed the City's ordinance under LLUPA. Instead, the Court determined that the 
ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's police power. Accordingly, any argument by KGF 
that the City of Ketchurn has no power to zone tlvough its police powers is erroneous. 
As stated supra, the other source of authority to enact zoning regulations is LLUPA, 
which actually requires Idaho's cities and counties to zone. "Every city and county shall 
exercise the powers conferred by this chapter." I.C. 5 67-6503. This inclusive language exists 
because the Act requires that the regulatory scheme be created at the local level. Further, within 
its zoning districts, Idaho's cities and counties "shall where appropriate, establish standards to 
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories . . ." I.C. 5 67-651 1. 
Like the Idaho Constitution, LLUPA cites the exercise of police powers as its purpose in 
I.C. § 67-6502: 
PURPOSE. The purpose of this act shall be to promote the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the people of the state of Idaho as follows: 
(a) To protect property rights while making accommodations for other 
necessary types of development such as low-cost housing and mobile home parks. 
(b) To ensure that adequate public facilities and services are provided to the 
people at reasonable cost. 
(c) To ensure that the economy of the state and localities is protected. 
(d) To ensure that the important environmental features of the state and 
localities are protected. 
(e) To encourage the protection of prime agricultural, forestry, and mining 
lands for production of food, fibre, and minerals. 
(f) To encourage urban and urban-type development within incorporated 
cities. 
(g) To avoid undue concentration of population and overcrowding of land. 
(h) To ensure that the development on land is commensurate with the physical 
characteristics of the land. 
(i) To protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and 
disasters. 
6) To protect fish, wildlife, and recreation resources. 
(k) To avoid undue water and air pollution. 
(1) To allow local school districts to participate in the community planning 
and development process so as to address public school needs and impacts on an 
ongoing basis. 
Idaho Courts have acknowledged that this grant of authority is broad. "In enacting 
(LLUPA), the legislature obviously intended to give local governing boards, such as the 
Kootenai County Commissioners, broad powers in the area of planning and zoning." Worley 
Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 835,663 P.2d 1135,1137 (Ct. App.1983), 
In fact, this grant of authority is so broad that there is not a single case where the Idaho 
Supreme Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals has overturned a zoning ordinance because the 
ordinance exceeded this grant of authority. The Court has found ordinances to be illegal or 
unconstitutional based upon procedural deficiencies, being in conflict with the general laws, or 
being barred by the doctrine of implied preemption, but not simply for exceeding the grant of 
authority. 
KGF appears to focus on Ketchum's ability to preserve existing structures by regulating 
height through the TDR Ordinance. KGF built a 38 foot building and was under the mistaken 
impression that "no building could be built in the hture that would obstruct [its] views." (R. p. 
18, Afldavit ofKevin G. Fortun, 73,74.) In fact, even without the TDR Ordinance, a conditional 
use permit for a planned unit development could be granted to allow greater building heights 
than 38 feet. (R. p. 21 1, Affidavit of Fritz linernrnerle, Exhibit I ,  "City's Response to Request 
for Admission No. 5.") 
KGF's argument that ICetchum cannot regulate building height through a TDR Ordinance 
must fail since Ketchum retains the power to regulate land use and zoning through its police 
powers, provided it complies with the statutory procedures set forth in LLUPA. Ketchum 
exercised that right by enacting a TDR Ordinance. Thus, Ketchum is only precluded from 
adopting a TDR Ordinance if the existing state statutes regarding TDRs are in conflict with 
Ketchum's Ordinance or if the State has occupied the field of TDRs. It is important to note that 
the height regulation in Ketchum's TDR Ordinance's is not in conflict but rather, is consistent 
with LLUPA. Provided it is consistent with LLUPA, Ketchum has a constitutional right to 
regulate land use and building height. The Idaho Supreme Court made this clear in Clyde Hess 
Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505,512,210 P.2d 798, 801, 
that a municipality, under the constitutional provision in question, has authority 
to make police regulations not in conflict with general laws, coequal with the 
authority of the legislature to pass general police laws. The legislature can pass 
a general law effective upon all, but it cannot restrict the constitutional right of a 
municipality to make police regulations not in conflict or inconsistent with such 
general law. 
Consequently, since Ketchum has the general authority to enact a TDR Ordinance 
through its police powers, KGF must demonstrate that Ketchum's TDR Ordinance is in 
conflict or inconsistent with the existing state statutes concerning TDRs. ICGF has not 
met this burden, 
B. NEITHER THE HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT NOR THE LOCAL LAND 
USE PLANNING ACT LIMIT KETCHUM'S AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE 
TDR ORDINANCE 
The City of Ketchum can clearly change height regulations pursuant to I.C. $ 67-651 1. 
This power is applicable to any building, including those next to KGF's building. Regardless of 
the City's method of regulation, KGF does not have the legal right to control the height of future 
adjacent buildings. Instead, KGF argues that the City cannot preserve structures through its TDR 
Ordinance, thereby allowing increased building heights. It argues that the only type of TDR 
Ordinances that can be adopted must be adopted within strict confiiies pursuant to a limited 
interpretation of 3 67-6515A, the Local Land Use Planning Act, or $ 67-4619, the Historic 
Preservation Act. KGF's argument presumes that the City had no authority to utilize TDRs prior 
to enactment of $ 67-6515A, the Local Land Use Planning Act, or 3 67-4619, the Historic 
Preservation Act, and therefore, that a city no longer holds its police power to zone, even if not 
in conflict with said provisions. 
KGF must demonstrate that the City's TDR Ordinance is either in direct conflict with the 
general laws of the state or that its TDR Ordinance is barred under the doctrine of implied 
preemption on the basis that the State has entirely "occupied" the field of TDRs. "The concept 
of 'conflict' broadens when put in the context of a determination of state preemption over a field 
of regulation. Of course, direct conflict (expressly allowing what the state disallows) is a 
'conflict'. State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). Additionally, a 'conflict' 
between state and local regulation may be implied [under the doctrine of preemption]." 
Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee County, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 
(1987). 
In order to analyze a conflict between a local ordinance and a state statute, it is important 
to understand the powers granted to cities and counties and also to the state legislature by the 
state constitution. Cities and counties are political subdivisions of the state and possess those 
powers that have been granted directly by the state constitution or by legislative statutes. So, 
cities and counties do not inherently possess any power and must rely on a grant of power. Thus, 
Idaho is referred to as a "Dillon's Rule" state.3 "[Ulnder Dillon's Rule, a city may exercise only 
those powers granted to it by either the state constitution or the legislature and the legislature has 
absolute power to change, modify or destroy those powers at its discretion." Caesar v. State, 101 
Idaho 158,160,610 P.2d 517,519 (1980). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that the Idaho Constitution contains a 
direct grant of police power to Idaho cities and counties, and that cities do not need to look to the 
The theoly of state preeminence over local governments was expressed as Dillon's Rule in a 1868 case, 
statutes passed by the Legislature as a source of their police power. Any county or incorporated 
city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws. Idaho Constitution, Article XII, Section 
2. The Idaho legislature has further articulated the constitutional grant of authority to cities in 
I.C. 5 50-302, which states, in part: 
Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and 
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be 
expedient, in addition to the special powers in this act granted, to maintain 
the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, 
commerce and industry. 
Additionally, Idaho Code 5 50-301 states that every city is a body politic, and has the powers 
specified in Title 50 or in other statutes, and can "exercise all powers and perform all functions 
of local self-government in city affairs as are not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with the 
general laws or the constitution of the state of Idaho." Thus, the legislative arm of city 
government has both expressed and implied power to promulgate ordinances, rules and 
regulations, which, in the judgment of the city, promote the general welfare of the city. 
Included as part of these express legislative grants of power are certain implied powers. 
Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P.2d 517, 519 (1980). As a general rule, if a city or 
county has the express power to engage in an activity, it also has the implied power to do those 
things necessary or appropriate to carry out the express power. Plummer v. City of l;ruitland, 140 
Idaho 1,5, 89 P.3d 841, 845 (2003). 
In other words, as long as an ordinance is based on a valid exercise of police powers, 
such as a zoning or land use ordinance, the only restriction on a city's power is that the ordinance 
not "be in conflict with [the city's] charter or with the general laws" or that the city not "act in 
an area which is so completely covered by general law as to indicate it is a matter of state 
concern". Idaho Constitution, Article XII, Section 2; Caesar at 161, 520. 
If a city ordinance does conflict with a state statute, it is said to be "preempted." 
Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee Counly, 112 Idaho 687,689,735 P.2d 998,1000 
(1987). Preemptioil generally refers to the displacing effect that state law will have on a 
conflicting or inconsistent local law (ordinance). Id. There are certain instances where state law 
preempts a city's ability to legislate any further on a topic. Id. For example, if state law declares 
something completely illegal, such as gambling, a city cannot pass an ordinance making it legal 
since such an ordinance would be a conflict with the general laws of the state. Other examples 
of state preemption of a particular subject matter are in the areas of hazardous waste disposal and 
water rights. Envirosafe Services, 112 Idaho at 693, 735 P.2d at 1004; Ralph Naylor Fai?lzs, 
LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,810, 172 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2007). 
There are two situations where preemption claims may arise: express preemption and 
implied preemption. Express preemption occurs where the state legislature says within the 
statute 'we hereby preempt' or uses words of similar import. In such a case, state laws are 
explicitly precluding local regulations. State v Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). 
The more common type of preemption is referred to as implied preemption. Implied 
preemption has, within itself, two sub-categories: conflicts preemption and preemption because 
state law occupies the field. Conflicts preemption is where it is impossible to comply with both 
the state law and the local law. Id at 219, 204. In this situation, the state statute must be 
followed. It is, however, appropriate to have two laws, one state and one local, that differ. 
Preemption would only occur if the state and local laws were mutually exclusive. 
The other type of implied preemption is preemption because state law occupies the field. 
In this situation, one must look at the Legislature's intent, and whether the state law was meant 
to be exclusive in that area. Envirosafe Seuvices, 112 Idaho at 688,735 P.2d at 999. 
KGF has not asserted that the State has expressly preempted the use of TDRs, nor has 
KGF asserted that Ketchum's TDR Ordinance is in conflict with the general laws of the state. 
Rather, KGF has asserted an implied conflict. Yet, neither LLUPA nor the Historic Preservation 
Act indicates any intent on the part of the state legislature to so fully occupy the field of TDRs as 
to prohibit Ketchum from enacting a TDR Ordinance for other purposes. 
Under an implied conflict, Ketchum's ordinance can be prohibited under the doctrine of 
preemption only if ICGF can demonstrate that state statutes, here I.C. 3 67-6515A and LC. 3 67- 
4601 et seq., so fully "occupy the field" of TDRs as to exclude Ketchum's TDR Ordinance, 
The Idaho Supreme Court has established the doctrine of implied preemption as follows: 
Where it can be inferred from a state statute that the state has intended to fully 
occupy or preempt a particular area, to the exclusion of [local governmental 
entities], a [local] ordinance in that area will be held to be in conflict with the 
state law, even if the state law does not so specifically state. Caesar v. State, 101 
Idaho 158, 161,610 P.2d 517,520 (1980). 
The doctrine of implied preemption typically applies in instances where, despite 
the lack of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental 
entities, the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be 
assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation. 'The [local 
governmental entity] cannot act in an area which is so completely covered by 
general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern.' Caesar, 101 Idaho 
at 161,610 P.2d at 520. 
In Envirosafe Services, supra, Owyhee County attempted to regulate hazardous waste 
facilities by way of a county ordinance even though a comprehensive state-level regulatory 
scheme was already in effect. In striking down the local ordinance on the basis of implied 
preemption, the Court considered the language of state statutes, the comprehensiveness of the 
state regulatory scheme created by those statutes and the unique nature of hazardous waste as 
needing exclusively state-level control. 
The Court noted that the relevant code sections evinced a strong legislative intent that 
regulation of the field of hazardous waste disposal be regulated by means of one, uniform 
statewide scheme enabling this state to enter into meaningful interstate agreements. 
This is in direct contrast to the Acts that reference the use of TDRs. The two Acts, 
LLUPA and the Historic Preservation Act, create only broad parameters and minimal 
restrictions. Unlike these broad parameters and rninimal restrictions set forth in the two Acts, in 
Envirosafe, the Court found that the regulatory scheme was so comprehensive as to leave no 
room for local regulation of the same subject matter. 
[The state regulations constitute] a comprehensive statutory scheme of the kind 
which implicitly evidences legislative intent to preempt the field. The [Hazardous 
Waste Management Act] provides for regulation, trip permits and a manifest 
system for those who transport hazardous waste; it further regulates a permit 
system for hazardous waste facilities and provides recording and reporting 
requirements for generators and facilities; fee systems and dedicated funds for 
emergency responses, and monitoring are also provided. There are also code 
sections dealing with citizen suits, local governmental notice, interstate 
cooperation, employment security, as well as broad ellforcement provisions. 
The HWMA speaks for itself. This state's legislature has acted in an all- 
encompassing fashion towards regulating the field of hazardous waste disposal. 
Id. at 690. (Citations omitted). 
In Caesar, the prior decision on which the Court relied heavily in deciding Envirosafe, 
the Plaintiff was injured while exiting Bronco Stadium after watching a football game. Caesar v. 
State, 101 Idaho 158, 610 P.2d 517 (1980). Alleging negligence per se on the grounds that the 
stadium failed to meet the minimum requirements of the City of Boise's building code, the 
Plaintiff sued the state of Idaho as the owner of the stadium. The Court held that the state is not 
subject to the city's building code because the applicable state statutes taken as a whole, 
"indicate that the area of state-owned buildings is completely covered by the general law and 
may not be subjected to an ordinance which is purely local in nature." Id. at 162. 
The Caesar Court found it significant that former I.C. 5 67-2304 empowered the 
Commissioner of Public Works to ensure the safe construction of public buildings subject to the 
approval of the Permanent Building Fund Council. The Court found the language of that statute 
to be even more compelling. "Since the purpose of Title 67, Chapter 23, as expressly stated in 
I.C. 3 67-23 11 was 'to render all public buildings now or hereafter owned or maintained by the 
state of Idaho, or any official, department, board, commission or agency thereof reasonably free 
from hazards to the general public, we deem that the legislature intended to allocate this police 
power to the state in its concern for the safety of the general public." Id. at 161. In contrast, the 
language in LLUPA, LC. 5 67-6515A, and the Historic Preservation Act, LC. 67-4601 et seq., 
does not even imply such exclusivity and there is no evidence of any such legislative intent in 
either of these Acts. 
In Caesar, there was a comprehensive regulatory scheme, overlapping laws and 
overlapping regulatory agencies to the point of redundancy and conflict. However, state and 
local laws may overlap so long as the state has not "acted in the area in such a pervasive manner 
that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation." An example of 
such permissive overlapping may be found in Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Board 
ofcounty Com'rs of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). In Benewah County 
Cattlemen's Ass'n., the Plaintiff argued that a county ordinance prohibiting livestock from 
running at large was preempted by Idaho's herd district statutes, LC. § 25-2401 et seq. The 
Court disagreed, holding that the "extension or amplification of that control by county ordinance 
is not prohibited in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions clearly evidencing intent 
on a statewide basis to permit livestock to freely roam and graze regardless of the ownership or 
the character of lands." Id. at 213, 89. As demonstrated, a local government may further restrict 
an activity already restricted by the state so long as the state legislature has not indicated its 
intent to occupy the field. To the same degree, a local government may expand upon a broad 
grant of authority from the state as is the case of Ketchum's TDR Ordinance and Benewah 
County's livestock ordinance. 
No such all-encompassing and comprehensive regulatory scheme exists with respect to 
TDRs. LLUPA contains only a single passage addressing TDRs - I.C. 9 67-6515A. That statute 
delegates the creation of the regulatory scheme to the local government and states only that the 
local government may create development rights and authorize landowners to transfer such rights 
subject to such "conditions as the governing body shall determine to fulfill the goals of the city 
or county to preserve open space, protect wildlife habitat and critical areas, and enhance and 
maintain the rural character of land with contiguity to agricultural lands suitable for long-range 
farming and ranching operations. . . ." I.C. 3 67-65 15A(l)(a). 
I.C. § 67-6515A is perhaps more significant for what it does not state. It does not state 
that TDRs shall be used only for agricultural preservation purposes and for no others. It does not 
even define the term "critical areas." The passage does set forth a few requirements and 
restrictions. For insta~~ce, the program must be voluntary, a market analysis must be performed 
prior to designating sending and receiving areas and acquisition of TDRs may not be made a 
condition of approval; however, these requirements are far from a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, especially when viewed with the broad grant of power to regulate land use invested by 
the Idaho Constitution and the other provisions of LLUPA. 
Contrary to the claims of KGF, the legislative history for lj 67-6515A does not make it 
clear that the statute was intended to only allow TDRs to apply to open space and agricultural 
lands. In fact, both the House Statement of Purpose and the Minutes of March 1, 1999, refer to a 
program "to protect significant land resources while compensating the property owner." (R. p. 
21 1, AfJidavit of Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit I). If lj 67-6515A does allow for the protection of 
critical areas, as such critical areas are defined by Ketchum, Ketchum complied with the 
requirements set forth in § 67-65 15A. 
Further, even if 5 67-6515A only applies to agricultural lands and open space, there is 
nothing in the legislative history that even suggests the Legislature intended to preempt the field 
of TDRs. Rather, several of the representatives refer to the statute merely as a "voluntary tool." 
(R. p. 211, Af$davit of Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 1, Minutes of March 15, 1999). Such a 
voluntary tool coexists along with other such tools provided and authorized in the Idaho 
Constitution and LLUPA. KGF's interpretation of 5 67-6515A would expand the limitations 
placed on the use of TDRs for agricultural lands and open space to apply to the use of TDRs for 
all purposes. Such an expansion of the statute is not supported by either the language of the 
statute itself or by the legislative history. 
KGF also claims that LLUPA andlor I.C. 5 67-6515A cannot provide authority for 
Ketchurn's TDR Ordinance because the planner that worked on the drafting of the TDR 
Ordinance stated that the purpose was the preservation of historic properties. As addressed 
supra, the language of LC. 3 67-6515A does not prohibit the use of TDRs for other purposes. 
Additionally, as argued inza, the Historic Preservation Act explicitly recognizes the city's ability 
to preserve historic properties pursuant to LLUPA or the general police powers of a city. 
Regardless, a city employee's belief as to the authority for the City's ordinance is irrelevant to an 
analysis of that authority. 
The City has the authority to preserve historic properties and heritage sites through the 
provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act. LLUPA provides broad authority to the City to 
provide for the protection of important environmental features. That authority includes the 
ability to utilize TDRs. The mere recognition in 5 67-6515A of the City's ability to use TDRs to 
preserve agricultural areas does not conflict with the City's ability to use TDRs for others 
purposes, and it does not occupy the field such that any other use of TDRs is preempted. 
Similarly, the use of TDRs in the Historic Preservation Act to preserve designated 
historic properties does not preclude the use of TDRs to preserve non-designated historic 
properties. The purpose of the Historic Preservation Act is set forth in 3 67-4601, which 
recognizes that "the historical, archeological, architectural and cultural heritage of the state is 
among the most important environmental assets of the state." I.C. 3 67-4602 sets forth the only 
two definitions set forth in the Act. Historic preservation is defined and historic property is 
defined. Historic property is defined as "any building, structure, area or site that is significant in 
the history, architecture, archeology or culture of this state, its communities or the nation." I.C. 3 
67-4602 (a). The additional statutes in the Act provide for the formation of a preservation 
commission, the creation of a historic district and the designation of historic property. 
The creation of a historic district allows a city to impose significant restrictions on 
buildings within the district. Likewise, the formal designation as a liistoric property allows a city 
to impose significant restrictions on buildings that are designated as historic properties. 
Accordingly, only properties that are eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic 
Places are eligible to become "designated historic properties." 
Despite the broad and inclusive definition in the Act of "historic property," which 
includes properties that are not eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places, 
and despite the broad purposes set forth in the Act, KGF contends that cities are only allowed to 
protect historic properties by creating a historic district or by designating the property as a 
"designated historic property." Thus, presumably, any other protection of historic properties is 
prohibited. 
This parsimonious interpretation of the I-Iistoric Preservation Act directly conflicts with 
the reservation of power set forth in 5 67-4612, which states "[iln addition to any power or 
authority of a county or city to regulate by planning or zoning laws and regulations or by local 
laws and regulations, the governing body of any county or municipality is empowered to provide 
by ordinances, special conditions or restrictions for the protection, enhancement and preservation 
of historic properties.. . " 
Despite this direct recognition of a city's plenary power to provide for the protection of 
historic properties, KGF continues to argue that Ketchurn is only entitled to protect historic 
properties by the recognition of a historic district and/or the classification of a designated historic 
property. It does this by claiming that since 5 67-4612 is a "general" statute and 3 67-4614 is a 
"specific" statute, statutory construction requires that 5 67-4614 must control. However, such an 
assertion ignores the requirement that the there must be a conflict between the two statutes or 
that the general statute must be vague or ambiguous for this statutory constructioi~ mle to 
operate. Neither requirement applies here. Providing procedures for the protection of designated 
historic properties does not conflict with the recognitioil the city can also provide protection for 
non-designated historic properties. Further, there is no ambiguity in 5 67-4612. It explicitly 
provides for the protection of non-designated historic properties, both pursuant lo the Historic 
Preservation Act and pursuant to a city's power to regulate by planning or zoning laws. 
KGF tries lo make the same argument in regard to I.C. 5 67-4619, which allows for the 
use of TDRs for designated historic properties. It claims that since I.C. 5 67-4619 is the only 
section that authorizes the transfer of development rights in the Historic Preservatioil Act, and 
since Ketchum did not comply with I.C. 5 67-4619, it does not have the authority to enact its 
TDR Ordinance. 
Under KGF's interpretation of LC. § 67-4619, Ketchum's authority to allow a TDR is 
limited solely to properties that are designated as historic properties pursuant to I.C. 67-4614. 
Accordingly, under KGF's statutory interpretation, Ketchum is prohibited froin using TDRs to 
protect properties that are not eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. 
The same analysis that applies to 5 67-4614 also applies to 5 67-4619. There is simply 
no language in 5 67-4619 that even implies that a city may not use TDRs to protect non- 
designated historic properties. Such a right is clearly preserved in 5 67-4612, which empowers a 
city to provide for the protection, enhancement and preservation of non-designated historic 
properties. If 5 67-4619 is read to provide limitations on the use of TDRs for both designated 
and non-designated historic properties, the result would be an expansion of the reach of Fj 67- 
4619 far beyond its plain meaning. 
KGF is correct that I.C. 5 67-4601 et seq. discusses TDRs in only a single section - I.C. 5 
67-4619. However, like LLUPA, LC. 5 67-4619 leaves the entire regulatory scheme, "subject to 
such conditions as the [local govemnent] shall detennine." Accordingly, I.C. Fj 67-4601 et seq. 
provides both for the preservation of properties eligible for inclusion in the National 
Register of Historic Places, and for the preservation of other historic properties. Further, I.C. Fj 
67-4612 also recognizes the power of cities to protect historic properties by planning and zoning 
laws. The language of LC. 5 67-4612 emphatically defeats KGF's argument that the Historic 
Preservation Act was intended to occupy the field of protecting historic properties. 
Similar to I.C. 5 67-6515A, there is also nothing in the legislative history of Title 67, 
Chapter 46 that exhibits any intent to occupy the TDR field. In fact, KGF has not provided any 
evidence of the substance of any discussions concerning the bill. The House Statement of 
Purpose for the Preservation of Historic Sites merely references "conserving historic properties 
for the education, pleasure, and enrichment of the citizens of the State." (R. p. 21 1, Affidavit of 
Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 2, HS2128 Statement of Purpose.) I.C. 5 67-4602 defines historic 
properties in a way that clearly encompasses much more than just sites eligible for designation 
on the National Register of Historic Places. Consequently, KGF is unable to provide any 
evidence in the legislative history that the legislature intended to limit land use regulatory powers 
granted through the Idaho Constitution and LLUPA with the Historic Preservation Act. 
Moreover, the plain language of I.C. 5 67-4612 explicitly rejects any claim of ilnplied 
preemption by specifically preserving the city's power or authority to regulate by planning or 
zoning laws and local laws and regulation, and empowering the city to provide by ordinances, 
special conditions or restrictions for the preservation of historic properties. If § 67-4614 is 
interpreted as limiting the City's ability to protect historic properties to only those eligible for the 
National Register of Historic Places or those in designated historic districts, I.C. 5 67-4612, I.C. 
3 67-4613, and I.C. 5 67-4602 are rendered entirely superfluous. Rather, a reasonable 
interpretation of all of the statutes in Title 67, Chapter 46 provides for the comprehensive 
program undertaken at all levels of government referred to I.C. 5 67-4601, which includes 
multiple classes of properties and a recognition of the broad grant of authority of cities to protect 
historic properties. 
Ketchum has implemented a TDR ordinance that regulates building height for the 
protection of non-designated historic properties and heritage sites, to foster economic 
development, and to implement community design. Ketchum "does not attempt to authorize by 
the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly 
licensed, authorized, or required, [thus] there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of 
the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective." Clyde Hess 
Distributing Co. at 5 10, 800. 
C. KGF'S UNIFORMITY ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT 
KGF makes a final argument that if Ketchum has the authority to adopt a TDR Ordinance 
through its police powers, it must comply with the statutory requirements of LLUPA. In 
particular, KGF argues that allowing the use of TDRs to increase building height violates the 
uniformity standard of LC. § 67-651 1, which requires that "[all1 standards shall be uniform for 
each class or kind of buildings throughout each district." 
Uniformity is essentially a recognition of the right to equal protection. As set forth in 
McMillan's Law of Municipal Corporations, Section 25.61, it is a general rule of law that zoning 
ordinances must be unifonn and equal in operation and effect; however, an ordinance is not 
discriminatory merely because it permits use in one district or zone while excluding them from 
another nor because it classifies and distinguishes uses within a particular zone or district. LC. 5 
67-651 1 recognizes this distinction. I.C. 5 67-651 1 does not require that the standards for all 
buildings within a district he uniform. It merely requires that the standards for each class or kind 
of building must be uniform within a district. 
The only Idaho appellate case that discusses the uniformity standard is Moerder v. City of 
Moscow, 78 Idaho 246, 300 P.2d 808 (1956). In that particular case, setbacks were determined 
by calculating an average of existing buildings, so that any time a building was built, the setback 
changed. It was impossible to read the ordinance and determine what the standard was. The 
ordinance created a standard that was completely fluid and it changed building by building. The 
Moerder Court determined that the ordinance did not create a regulation that was uniform as to a 
specific class but instead created a regulation that changed at the whim of individual builders. 
Ketchum's TDR Ordinance is completely distinguishable from Moscow's ordinance. 
Ketchum went through a very involved political process to create three classes: sending sites, 
receiving sites, and sites that are neither sending nor receiving sites. It identified each class, it 
identified the standard for each class and it identified how each class would be regulated. The 
standard within each class is uniform. 
KGF is essentially arguing that I.C. $ 67-6511 requires that the regulation for every 
building within a zone inust be uniform. However, that's not what the statute says. I.C. $ 67- 
651 1 allows the City to create regulations for classes andlor kinds of buildings within a zoning 
district, provided the classes bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. 
Here, the City of Ketchum is protecting historic properties, protecting the city's identity and 
fostering economic development. Thus, the classes created by the City's TDR Ordinance bear a 
rational relationship to those legitimate legislative objectives, and the Ordinance complies with 
I.C. $ 67-651 1. 
D. KETCHUM IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S COSTS AND 
PEES; KGP IS NOT 
In civil judicial proceedings against a city, the Court may award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party only if the opposing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.C. § 12-1 17. The City provided three separate and distinct legal theories for its determination 
that it has the power to enact a TDR Ordinance. Any one of the theories provides a reasonable 
basis for the City to believe it was entitled to adopt the TDR Ordinance. 
The District Court also determined in this case and in a previous case that there is no 
evidence that the State sought to preempt the City's preservation of historic buildings andlor the 
use of TDRs. The District Court recognized that case law firmly holds that extension or 
amplification of control by local ordinance is not prohibited in the absence of constitutional or 
statutory provisions clearly evidencing intent to preempt local control. Thus, K e t c h h  clearly 
had a reasonable basis in law to enact its TDR Ordinance. That basis was upheld by the District 
Court. 
ICGF suggests that it should be entitled to attorney's fees because the City acted 
unreasonably by adopting Ordinance 1034 after it became aware of problems with its authority to 
enact the predecessor Ordinance 1005. This is a misstatement of the evidence. Ordinance 1005 
was found void due only to faulty notice, which the City corrected with the adoption of 
Ordinance 1034. (Appellant's Opening BrieA Statement of Facts, p. 7,716.) In fact, the District 
Court held the City had the authority to adopt the previous TDR Ordinance, Ordinance 1005, as 
reiterated in its decision regarding this case (Tr. p. 46, L. 25; p. 47, LL. 1-2). 
In upholding Ketchum's TDR Ordinance, the District Court determined that there is no 
evidence that the State sought to preempt the regulation of historic building andlor the use of 
TDRs in planning and zoning. Since ICetchum acted with a reasonable basis in law, KGF is not 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
In addition, the District Court had already ruled that the City had the authority to enact a 
TDR Ordinance in KGF's earlier challenge to the predecessor TDR Ordinance, #1005. (Tr. p. 
46, L. 25; p. 47, LL. 1-2). Thus, ICGF has no reasonable basis in law to challenge Ketchum's re- 
adoption of a TDR Ordinance and no reasonable basis to appeal the District Court's decision 
upholding Ketchum's TDR Ordinance. The City of Ketchum requests attorney's fees in 
defending this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code $ 5  12-121 and/or 12-1 17, and Idaho Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 40 and 41. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court's decision should be affirmed. Ketchum should be 
awarded its attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of July, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing documents this day 
of July, 2009 served up011 the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Michael Pogue 
Lawson, Laski, Clark, & Pogue, PLLC 
P.O. Box 3310 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: U.S. Mail 
Fritz X. Haemmerle 
Haemmerle & Haemmerle, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1800 
IHailey, ID 83333 
Method: U.S. Mail 

